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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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There is increasing dissatisfaction with cost growth in major defense acquisition 
programs. Cost growth crowds out other investments, stresses budgets or causes schedule 
slips, all of which result in a military force that is less capable than previously expected. Several 
recent studies have recommended two categories of reforms: capital budgeting reforms seek 
stability in acquisition accounts, and rational cost model reforms seek to reduce the percentage 
increase of final cost over budget estimates. In both categories, undesirable secondary effects 
may be worse than the desirable primary effects; specifically, reforms that reduce cost growth 
may do so by driving total costs higher. This study examines these reforms and discusses their 
secondary effects. The paper concludes that the current practice of generating low estimates, 
coupled with dissatisfaction with cost growth may best serve to limit total cost. 
Introduction 
Cost growth in defense acquisition programs is a problem that captures the attention of 
the general public, the media, Congress, defense reformers, and the acquisition community. 
Cost growth is said to reduce the affordability of the long-term defense program, resulting in top-
line budget increases, reduced or late programs, or a combination of the two. Despite over a 
decade of growing defense budgets (even when one excludes the burden and cost of GWOT 
borne outside the regular budget process), service chiefs feel increasingly constricted in their 
procurement accounts. From 2001 to 2007, the planned investment in new programs doubled—
from a portfolio valued at approximately $750 billion to almost $1.5 trillion (GAO, 2007, March, 
p. 3). Cost growth is a persistent and perhaps intractable problem: 
 Historical performance has not been good. The GAO has included defense acquisition 
management among its High Risk programs since the list began in 1990, in part due to 
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cost management. “Weapons systems routinely take much longer to field, cost more to 
buy, and require more support than provided for in investment plans” (GAO, 2007, 
January, p. 61).  The GAO’s review of 27 weapons systems showed total cost growth of 
19%, RDT&E growth of over 33% and schedule slippages of 23% (GAO 2007, March, p. 
9). Looking back over the last three decades, RAND has shown that cost growth has 
averaged about 46%—that is, programs actually cost 46% more than estimated at 
Milestone B—and that cost performance has not improved despite numerous and 
continuous acquisition reform efforts (Younossi et al., 2007).  
 The problem is expected to continue into the future. Using historical performance as a 
predictor of future needs, the CBO projects that the investment accounts in the FYDP 
are underfunded by about 28% (CBO, 2007, p. 14).   
 The phenomena are well-understood and documented. The Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) report stated:  
Over many years, 128 studies have been done to address perceived problems 
with the system and to prevent waste, fraud and abuse. Historically, we observed 
that cost and schedule instability have been a problem in all system acquisitions 
since the Civil War. We see some of the same issues as problems today that the 
Packard Commission saw 20 years ago. (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 2)  
 The critics and ideas are not all external to the Department. The DoD’s own Acquisition 
Transformation Report to Congress lists seven implementation goals. Three include the 
term “cost-effective” in their title, and a fourth relates to governance and decision 
processes (Kreig, 2007, p. 6). It is not that DoD is turning a deaf ear; the intentions are 
all good. 
There is no shortage of recommendations and plans to fix the problems of cost growth. 
Defense contractors, advisory bodies, and R&D centers have spent vast sums over the years 
chronicling such problems and offering solutions. Ninety (42%) of the 212 defense management 
reform initiatives in the period 1990-2006 dealt with acquisition and budgeting (Francis & 
Walther, 2006).   The study of reform agendas and recommendations is an exercise in 
organizational evolution. Just as Darwin noted the beaks of the finches on the Galapagos 
Islands adapted gradually to their environments, recommendations to fix acquisition evolve 
slightly from report to report. This article takes a radically different tack—a leap on the reform 
recommendation evolutionary path, if you will. This article will argue that the cost-growth 
phenomenon may not even be a problem. It probably is less of a problem than the proffered 
solutions. In fact, if we assume DoD policies and procedures have evolved purposefully with 
competent managers in light of the available knowledge, then the current system may be the 
best available to ensure programs are delivered at the lowest cost.  Attributes of some of the 
solutions to cost growth may actually drive total costs higher.  
Those who study defense acquisition point to several problems associated with cost 
growth. One set of problems is related to the decision whether to invest. Underestimation “leads 
to poor investment choices” by starting more or larger programs than the department can afford 
(Melese, Franck, Angelis & Dillard, 2007, p. 358). If there is a business rule that a certain cost-
benefit ratio threshold must be exceeded to make the initial investment, then an underestimate 
of cost may cause those making resource allocation decisions to err. Similarly, in an analysis of 
alternatives, if the cost estimates are not uniformly inaccurate, resource-allocation decision-
makers may make the wrong choice. 
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Another set of problems is related to the effects of growth after it occurs. Because the 
budget is a social contract, breaches of cost estimates can damage trust and relationships 
within government (Melese et al., 2007, p. 359). In some cases, they may breach legally 
imposed thresholds, the so-called Nunn-McCurdy breaches. When costs overrun, the remedy 
may involve stretching out schedules or reducing quantity, thereby reducing the new system’s 
effect on the operating forces. The remedy may instead be a reallocation of funds away from a 
lower-priority program, thereby causing a different program’s schedule or quantity to suffer. The 
remedy may also be a request for additional budget authority, imposing an opportunity cost for 
the nation as a whole. 
The two most commonly proposed solutions to cost growth address the two sides of the 
problem that are most under governmental control: budget stability and cost-estimation 
accuracy. The former contends that increased funding stability would allow the program 
manager to shift attention to non-financial factors by insulating the program from the vagaries of 
politics and execution-year fiscal maneuvers.  The GAO reported that over one-third of program 
managers said the biggest obstacle they faced was funding stability (GAO, 2005, p. 44). The 
latter contends that the problem originates with inaccurate cost estimates and that improved 
accuracy will contain cost growth. These reforms address the problem of unmet expectations by 
minimizing the amount of cost growth. In the process of doing so, they unfortunately fail to 
alleviate the effects of cost growth. In some cases, these reforms would introduce additional 
undesirable effects. This paper argues that instead of seeking to minimize relative cost growth, 
decision-makers should focus attention on minimizing total cost. Paradoxically, some of the very 
forces that hold total cost down are rooted in the dissatisfaction with cost growth.  
Capital Budgeting Reforms  
Private industry—as well as many state and municipal governments—employs separate 
processes to budget for capital items and operating expenses. Most people in managing their 
household budgets do the same: we apply one form of decision logic when budgeting for the 
electric bill or groceries and a different logic when deciding to purchase a new car or major 
appliance. Within the DoD, procurement budgets are worked alongside operating and salary 
budgets, and both are appropriated on an annual line-item basis. Reformers have often 
questioned this practice. Most recently, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment recommended a form of capital budgeting. 
Capital budgeting involves the analysis of costs and cash flows associated with an 
investment project that precedes and informs the decision to invest.  At most levels of 
government (excepting, notably, the federal government), capital investment decisions are 
made in tandem with the decision of how to finance them—most being paid for with revenue 
measures such as a special tax assessment or with debt instruments such as bond issuances 
or loans. There is a deliberate link between the investment and its implications for current and 
long-term budgets, fiscal policy, asset management, and cash flows (Lee & Johnson, 1998).  
The budgeting practice for capital investments at the federal level has a different flavor. 
Federal capital budgets do not necessarily need to be separate from operating budgets in the 
absence of the balanced budget requirements common at the state and municipal level. The 
sovereign federal government may run deficits, raise revenues, print money, and borrow more 
readily than any other organization. Linking the capital purchase to a specific revenue stream is 
not necessary. Annual resource flows are often sufficient to fully fund the federal capital 
projects. Thus, they face they same annual review and trade-off decision-making as operating 
budget accounts.  
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Irrespective of the budgetary concern, federal capital projects are sometimes viewed as 
mechanisms for affecting macroeconomic conditions. Capital projects may be started, not 
because the ends of the project are the main objective, but because the job itself, the means to 
the end, is highly desirable. Programs during the Great Depression like the PWA, WPA and 
TVA were as much about creating jobs as they were about building bridges and dams. Urban 
renewal projects are more about sociological factors than buildings. Likewise, some capital 
investments in military systems are made in part to effect public objectives other than military 
capability. These short-term and complementary goals that are achieved through capital 
programs confound the analysis and argue against a separate capital budgeting strategy.  
Private-sector capital budgeting practices are similar to those used in government and 
include lifecycle cost and benefit analyses. The costs include the obvious investment in the 
item, financing costs, and any incremental operating and support costs. Benefits include new 
revenue streams or lower operating and support costs. Investment decisions are based on one 
or more analytical techniques, such as payback period, net present value, or internal rate of 
return. These are benchmarked against a hurdle rate which represents the next best available 
use of the funds. Assuming the project will generate sufficient risk-adjusted return in a 
reasonable period of time, a capital budget is prepared. That budget is often distinct from, but 
affects, the organization’s annual operating and support budget. The capital budget may be 
prepared outside the annual operating and support budget cycle, the timing more aligned with 
project schedules than accounting cycles. Funds to pay for the capital project also may be 
raised separately from the revenues raised by routine operations (but the service of debt, for 
example, would be incorporated into future operating budgets). 
One significant problem with adapting capital budgeting for defense items is that there is 
no benefit that is easily defined in financial terms. Computation of a net present value or 
payback period is meaningless if the benefit and the cost cannot be expressed in consistent 
units.1  There is no clear rate of return against which to compare to a hurdle rate. What can be 
done, however, is to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis for competing proposals that perform 
essentially the same task. Two alternative proposals for meeting the same need have 
presumably equal benefits and, therefore, can be compared based solely on a cost analysis. 
But comparison of capital budgets for items that generate disparate benefits is very problematic. 
Acquisition reformers argue that best (or at least common) capital budgeting practices 
would provide much needed stability to the management of defense acquisition programs 
(Kadish et al., 2006; McCaffery & Jones, 2006). One form of the proposal is to separate the 
capital decision from the operating cost decision, to examine each capital decision when the 
program is ready, and to fund fully the development and acquisition costs at that time.  It is 
argued that such a practice will increase the likelihood of program success by addressing a 
significant risk factor. The FY 2007 Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress 
clearly shows that the DoD accepts this argument (Kreig, 2007, p. 20). Such proposals, 
however, involve risk. Indeed, secondary costs may outweigh the primary benefit.  
Isolating the capital investment decision necessarily removes it from the larger 
discussion of overall defense policy and resource allocation. The legislature prefers to debate 
and decide defense matters once in the annual authorization and appropriation process. 
Separating the capital items may cause the same issues to be debated twice or may mask 
                                                
1 Housel and Bell (2001) recognize this problem and suggest a methodology.  Practical application of that 
methodology in the DoD is unlikely in the near term, if ever. 
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interrelationships that should be considered as a whole. Just as the DoD considers the full 
portfolio of options during the programming phase of PPBE, the legislature needs to do the 
same. By separating the capital items from the rest of the program during budgeting, decision-
makers could eliminate that possibility. Given the legislature’s constitutional power to raise and 
support armies and provide and maintain a navy, such proposals seem politically infeasible. 
 Separation of the capital investment decision also has little practical benefit. Under 
existing full-funding policies, the entire amount to build an end-item is presumably budgeted and 
appropriated. If prepared properly, the budget request should have considered the lifecycle cost 
and independent cost analyses. If Congress appropriates the full funding in multi-year 
appropriations, based on the President’s Budget, then the goals of a capital budgeting process 
have already been met. Curiously, the trend in the DoD, at least in the Navy, has been to 
expand the use of incremental budgeting over full funding—a practice clearly at odds with the 
stated recommendation to adopt corporate-style capital budgeting practices. 
Another form of capital budgeting reform proposes to fence procurement dollars once 
appropriated. The problem this proposal attempts to remedy is that funds too easily move out of 
procurement programs to address contingent needs elsewhere in the budget. In some cases, 
one procurement program which is experiencing problems is assisted with funds taken from 
another procurement program. In other cases, contingencies may affect the operating accounts, 
and without sufficient budgetary slack to address the contingency, funds are transferred from 
procurement programs. The recommendation to fence funds, however, is a budgeting reform to 
what is actually a problem of execution discipline. If the services are concerned that funds are 
taken from one program to address issues in another, then they should simply stop doing that. 
Addressing the problem of execution discipline is a more appropriate remedy than creating a 
new budgetary approach.  Easier said than done, critics will say. So if this reallocation is 
inevitable, what are the effects of such fences? 
Fenced accounts serve to make the resources allocated to procurement more important 
than dollars allocated to operations; or, to put it another way, future readiness would become de 
facto more important than current readiness. It would be short-sighted to institutionalize such a 
decision, as it actually restricts flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. If the 
procurement accounts cannot be a source to deal with the contingency, what is the source? Pay 
accounts? Operations elsewhere around the globe? Such fences also tend to restrict funds 
flowing in both directions. Many an acquisition program has benefited from reprogramming 
actions in which funds are taken from operating accounts; separate capital accounts may 
restrict these flows. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program received 
over a billion dollars in FY 2007 that way.  The current process is not perfect, but it may be 
better than inappropriately adopting a practice that is “best” in a different context. 
To summarize, corporate and non-federal government models of capital budgeting do 
not adapt well to the federal government. While adoption of capital budgeting reforms would 
potentially stabilize the funding outlook for select acquisition programs, such actions inject 
rigidity into a process that demands flexibility in so many other areas. Fiscal law already 
imposes rigidity; the creation of special accounts for acquisition programs simply adds to that 
problem. Capital budgeting reforms are unlikely to be adopted if they limit broad analysis of the 
defense program and trade-offs within it.  Nor will adoption be likely if reforms challenge the 
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Existing processes already 
encourage the employment of some capital budgeting analytical processes; the specific 
remedies proposed are unlikely to resolve the problems of cost management. Indeed, they may 
create new problems. 
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Rational Cost Model Reforms 
The second area of reform concerns the cost estimate on which the investment decision 
and budget are based. As the GAO recently stated, “If we expect programs to be executed 
within budget, programs need to begin with realistic budgets. The foundation of an executable 
budget is a realistic cost estimate that takes into account the true risk and uncertainty in a 
program” (GAO, 2007, p. 17).  There is widespread dissatisfaction with the accuracy of defense 
cost estimating—both in Congress and within the DoD. When a program experiences cost 
growth above its budgeted amount, the allocation of funds in current or future-year budgets 
must be adjusted to keep the program on track; doing so requires either top-line relief or a 
decrease to one or more other program budgets.  Either way, expectations are unmet. Before 
evaluating some of the proposed remedies to this problem, we must understand the nature of 
the problem. 
Of course, one must acknowledge that the cost-growth problem involves three variables. 
First is the cost estimate (E), which is often cited as a discrete figure, but in reality is a range of 
values defined by a probability distribution. Second is the amount budgeted (B) for the 
program,2 which is a discrete value selected presumably from somewhere along the cost-
estimate probability curve. Third is the final cost of the program (C), a discrete value. The public 
often scrutinizes the difference between B and C, as these are the figures that exist in budget or 
appropriation documents, contract audits, SAR reports, and the like. Scholars and management 
reformers tend to also focus on the relationship between E and B, but the nuances often fail to 
capture the public’s and politicians’ interest. 
Shown graphically in Figure 1, a notional cost-estimate S-curve (so called because of its 
shape) will define a probability distribution based on the confidence of data populating the 
estimating model and the accuracy of the model itself (E). There is little probability of the 
government meeting the cost estimate at the low-dollar-value end of the curve, but a very high 
probability of meeting program goals at the high-dollar-value end of the curve.  During the 
budgeting process, a value is selected along the curve at the appropriate amount of funds—the 
precise point on the curve is the subject of some reform proposals and will be discussed shortly. 
For illustration purposes, the 50% probability value is shown (B). Eventually, at program 
completion, one has a final cost, notionally shown on the chart at value C. Cost growth is 
generally considered the difference between B and C. Many definitions of cost growth select B 
at acquisition Milestone B and C at program completion (or latest estimate if still ongoing), and 
years may pass between the formulation of B and the eventuality of C. 
                                                
2 To be even more precise, one could break down this variable into the programmed amount, the 
budgeted amount, the appropriated amount, and the amount actually provided to the program office. 
Those distinctions, though often quite real, are not necessary to make here. 
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Figure 1. Cost Growth Diagram 
It is important to first note that cost-estimating errors, when they exist, are 
overwhelmingly low compared to the cost estimate. This author has yet to read a study or hear 
a defense official or politician complain that cost estimates are too high and overestimating 
errors are a problem. While this may seem facetious, it is a critically important point. If cost-
estimating errors were a function of poor-quality data or technically inaccurate models, then one 
would expect normally distributed errors with a mean near zero. What we see is more of a 
lognormal distribution with very few observations of overestimation—as in Figure 2, below, from 
a RAND study.  This distribution suggests that there are biases in the data or models. 
Thankfully, biases can be found and eliminated. That is what much of the research and many of 
the recommendations in this area seek to do. 
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Figure 2. Cost-growth Factors (CGF) of Major Acquisition Programs 
(Arena, Leonard, Murry & Younossi, 2006, p. 22) 
What are the biases that affect cost estimates? RAND cites the following causes for cost 
growth: “overoptimism, estimating errors, unrecognized technical issues, requirements creep, 
lack of incentives to control cost, and schedule extensions” (Younossi et al., 2007, p. xxi). While 
unrecognized technical issues may indicate a poor estimate, unrecognizable errors do not. Most 
cost-estimating models make allowances for the likely ones; the unknowable ones should be 
distributed randomly, as should errors. Schedule extensions and requirements creep may help 
explain why final costs are higher than the estimate; however, they are not estimating problems 
if the changes to schedules and requirements occur subsequent to the estimate, and the 
estimate correctly considered the original schedule and requirement.  Further, it is incorrect to 
view cost growth as a problem in a situation in which requirements grow, and the cost of those 
requirements—had they been considered—would have been consistent with the estimate. In 
those cases, the item purchased is not the same as the item estimated.3 And in many cases, 
schedule extensions are an effect, not a cause, of cost growth. These are matters of program 
management discipline, not cost-estimating accuracy. A lack of incentives to control costs is 
also a matter of program management or oversight and is not a matter of cost estimating, 
directly. It may be an indirect factor, as we shall see below. That leaves overoptimism as a 
source of non-normal bias in the estimate. 
Melese and his co-authors blame two factors: “bad incentives (psychological and 
political-economic explanations) and bad estimation (methodological explanations)” (Melese et 
al., 2007, p. 359). Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2006) cites three categories of factors. One (technical 
estimating errors) he dismissed because of the non-normal distribution of errors and the general 
                                                
3 It is important here to acknowledge that, politically, this distinction may not matter. The public at large 
does not hold that information and only sees that the latest fighter (or ship or other program) has grown in 
cost. It does not see that the airplane that was bought is better than the one estimated. 
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lack of improvement over time. The other two, optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation,4 
are characterized as psychological and political factors, respectively. Thus, all three studies 
identify similar biases, but they suggest different remedies.  
The problem is that two types of bias exist in cost estimating: optimism and strategic 
misrepresentation. These biases affect the cost estimate, the amount budgeted for the program, 
or both. There are other forces that affect the final cost figure and manifest during the execution 
of the program: requirements creep (including the unforeseen technical issues), some schedule 
extensions, and incentive structures. Let us consider three proposed remedies to the cost-
estimating problem in light of these biases and factors. 
DAPA Recommendation—budget higher on the curve. To its credit, the DAPA report did 
not look solely at cost-estimating errors, but rather at the totality of issues affecting defense 
acquisition.5 As part of its authors’ comprehensive examination, recommendations were offered 
in several areas, including budgeting and cost control. Among those budgeting and cost control 
recommendations was the proposal to “Adjust program estimates to reflect ‘high confidence’—
defined as a program with an 80% chance of completing development at or below estimated 
cost” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 13). Acknowledging the overoptimism and strategic 
misrepresentation biases in the system, which they refer to as “the conspiracy of hope” (p. 102), 
the authors assert that using optimistic estimates (defined as the 50% confidence level) results 
in excessive restructuring of budgets and programs. Essentially, the DAPA report suggests an 
appropriate level of funding: that B should be set at a specific, higher, point on the E curve. 
There is an attractive logic to the DAPA proposal. If B were set higher on the E curve, 
one can be reasonably certain that the degree of cost growth would diminish. Presumably, only 
1/5 of programs would risk cost growth, and 4/5 should cost approximately what was budgeted. 
This would reduce the need for budgetary and programmatic adjustments, as far fewer 
programs would experience growth problems. This proposal, however, results in higher overall 
spending for the same programs. 
Federal appropriation law and the norms of the federal government are such that every 
dollar appropriated is expected to be spent. If a program is funded at the 50% probability level, 
there is an even chance it will either cost what was budgeted or will cost more.  In other words, 
there is nearly a 100% chance it will cost at least the 50% level. By funding that same program 
at the 80% probability level, there is zero chance that it will cost the amount of the 50% or the 
60% or the 75% estimate. There is a nearly 100% probability it will cost at least the 80% 
estimate. While funding at the higher level reduces the likelihood of cost growth, it does so by 
guaranteeing the higher cost in the first place. There is no longer the possibility of a negative 
effect on other programs; it is foreordained. Rather than risk the possibility of disrupting 
                                                
4 Jones & Euske define strategic misrepresentation as “the planned, systematic distortion or misstatement 
of fact—lying—in response to incentives in the budget process” (1991, p. 437). This definition is 
consistent with Flyvbjerg’s use of the term. 
5 The report warns that one should implement comprehensive change rather than incremental change.  
“Past practices are replete with examples demonstrating that if you adjust one part of the system with 
corrective measures, challenging issues surface in other parts of the system. When untested corrective 
action is taken, over time it can result in unintended consequences” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 82). This 
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secondary programs or altering schedules and reducing quantities of the primary program, 
those changes necessarily occur at the outset.   
Melese et al. Recommendation—TCE. In a study that looked specifically at cost-
estimating accuracy, Melese and his colleagues employ transaction cost economics (TCE) 
theory to the problem of cost growth. While acknowledging the psychological and political 
biases that create bad incentives, they mainly focus on improving bad estimation 
methodologies. The authors suggest the use of TCE will obtain less biased estimates which, in 
turn, will reduce the mean and variance of cost growth. Noting that inaccurate estimates may 
result from omitting variables, the estimator is encouraged to consider costs beyond production 
to “include coordination and motivation costs such as search and information costs, decision 
and contracting costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs” (Melese et al., 2007, p. 359). 
After clearly describing factors within the DoD and their contractors that drive cost growth, the 
authors conclude that “cost estimating techniques must properly anticipate extra transaction 
costs […] that can quickly overwhelm initial production cost estimates” (p. 365). 
There are two concerns with this approach. First, “TCE predicts contracts and other 
governance structures will be chosen that reduce transaction costs and improve the gains from 
exchange between buyers and sellers” (p. 367).  This is true only so far as both buyer and seller 
are motivated by a concern for economic efficiency. This is not necessarily true when one of the 
actors is a government. Rules governing competitive bidding, free trade, the use of small 
businesses, and Buy-American provisions all add transaction costs and often raise production 
costs. The public value in such rules is not economic; it is elsewhere in the complexion of values 
that define the public sector: values such as fairness, equity, accountability, or justice.  The 
evidence is not at all clear that the DoD is motivated to design governance structures, for 
instance, that reduce transaction costs. The excessively bureaucratic structure of the acquisition 
review and approval processes is hardly designed to be efficient. Those processes are arguably 
designed to limit undesirable effects more than they are designed to encourage desirable ones. 
Second, since acquisition cost growth is measured predominantly in production cost 
terms, the increases that are routinely experienced are in production costs; they are not caused 
by the omission of transaction costs. Cost growth is most commonly defined as increases in 
development and production costs as reported in Selected Acquisition Reports. In other words, 
those costs are the ones funded through RDT&E and procurement appropriations.  The majority 
of the transaction costs, on the other hand, are funded in operations appropriations. 
Contracting, contract administration, auditing, data collection, oversight, etc., are neither 
included in the baseline nor in the final cost estimate.6 The salary of the program manager is not 
even included. The omission of such costs does not account for the growth.  
The value of a TCE approach comes from the knowledge that managing those activities 
may reduce cost growth, but including them in the estimate will not. Inclusion of those costs in 
the estimate would have the additional unintended consequence of ascribing an economic value 
to those activities above the other social values they were intended to create. Audits are done 
not to reduce cost but to provide accountability and assurance to the public. Governance 
                                                
6 Volume 2A, Chapter 1 of the DoD Financial Management Regulations says: “The cost of civilian 
personnel compensation and other direct costs (i.e., travel, office equipment leasing, maintenance, 
printing and reproduction) incurred in support of procurement and/or production programs by 
departmental headquarters staff, contracting offices, contract audit offices, system project offices, and 
acquisition managers are expenses.” As expenses, they are not funded in the procurement accounts. 
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structures exist not only to hold economic costs down, but also to ensure against waste and 
fraud and to ensure compliance with the law.  Many of those laws are motivated by social, not 
economic values. Because of that, decision-makers should focus not on minimizing their drain 
on the acquisition of weapon systems, but rather on reducing the cost of attaining that social 
goal irrespective of the weapons system.  
Undoubtedly, a better understanding of the role transaction costs play in the motivation 
of sellers can assist in the negotiation and administration of contracts; that may, in turn, help 
lower the cost of production. But because many of those transaction costs serve non-economic 
goals, they should remain outside the cost estimate and the final cost tally.  
Flyvbjerg Recommendation—reference class forecasting.  There is another way to 
address the psychological and political biases other than using TCE. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
recommends using reference class forecasting—an estimating methodology based on 
Kahneman and Taversky’s (1979) work in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. 
Reference class forecasting addresses optimism and strategic misrepresentation biases by 
relying on the actual performance of a reference class of comparable projects. To combat the 
optimistic bias inherent in an “inside view” of the project, under reference class forecasting, 
those estimating the cost of a project assume an “outside view” by considering the experiences 
of comparable projects. In his study of public works projects, Flyvbjerg finds that different 
classes of projects improve their cost-estimating accuracy by apply various “uplifts” to the inside 
view estimates. He finds that to achieve the 80% probability level (the same probability the 
DAPA report recommends), estimates for road, bridge/tunnel, and rail projects should rise 32, 
55 and 57%, respectively. 
Reference class forecasting suffers from the same effect as the DAPA recommendation: 
improvements in cost-estimating accuracy are achieved by forfeiting the possibility of lower total 
costs. Reference class forecasting is not a new idea for defense acquisition. The “outside view” 
was the motivation for the creation of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group in 1972 and the 
requirement for independent cost estimates (Melese et al., 2007). The Congressional Budget 
Office employs this basic concept in their report series Long-term Implications of Current 
Defense Plans (CBO, 2007). The knowledge exists. One could even assume it is considered by 
decision-makers; it simply is not used. The important question is why not? 
All three studies suggest remedies to improve the accuracy of cost estimates and to 
lower the likelihood of cost growth in defense acquisition. They each acknowledge that cost 
growth is less a technical estimating problem as it is a problem of psychological and political 
bias. The three recommendations would all bring B closer to C on Figure 1 and would be able to 
claim gains in cost-estimating accuracy. This paper concedes that such methods are likely to 
reduce cost growth, but it also warns that they do little to address the ultimate problem of total 
cost. In fact, all three recommendations would aggravate rather than mitigate the ultimate 
problem: high costs crowding out other spending and their effect on military force structure. 
Why? Because all three methods program those costs with certainty rather than risk the 
possibility of them occurring later.  
One should notice that all three methods suggest that the DoD more fully consider costs 
known to exist. I submit that those costs are considered and intentionally dismissed for one of 
two reasons. One reason—acknowledged by Melese et al. and Flyvberg—is that a lower 
estimate may be politically necessary to achieve the “camel’s nose in the tent” effect. Wildavsky 
(1979) suggested that low initial budget estimates, while inaccurate, serve a useful purpose by 
getting a program initiated. Then, once it is initiated, upward adjustments are easier to obtain in 
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the future than approval of the program at the higher amount in the first place. Strategic 
misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Jones & Euske, 1991) is a common occurrence and one not 
undertaken lightly. Those engaging in strategic misrepresentation weigh the benefit of a higher 
probability of program initiation against the higher probability of a cost to one’s reputation and 
the inevitable downstream budget pressure. Evidently, in some cases, the balance tips in the 
favor of under-representing cost. 
Another reason for underestimating is that the Defense Department may be wittingly or 
unwittingly engaging in target costing (Monden & Hamada, 1991; Cooper & Slagmulder, 1997). 
Target costing is the practice of intentionally setting aggressive financial targets as an 
inducement to achieve those targets. It is done with full knowledge that there is a risk of cost 
growth, but that risk is accepted in exchange for the possibility of hitting the lower actual cost. 
Costs are managed through value engineering programs. The Navy’s recent goal of producing a 
Virginia class submarine for $2 billion is an example. Target costing is the opposite of what the 
three studies recommend. Target costing can be effective if the environment is such that: (a) 
program managers are not punished for missing cost goals if their actual performance is 
reasonable, and (b) resources are slack enough to cover the inevitable cost growth. Both 
conditions tend to exist in the DoD. 
Whether the reason for perpetuating low estimates is an example of the camel’s nose 
theory or target costing, such low estimates are of value to the DoD. In the first case, a desired 
but politically risky program is begun and, once begun, is likely to perpetuate. In the second 
case, pressures are applied to programs to hold costs down, and the possibility of actually 
hitting those ambitious targets is left open. The two reasons may co-exist: through ambitiously 
low estimates, sufficient resources are apparently made available to initiate a new program. In 
some cases, this is evidently preferable to raising the estimate of the first program to reduce the 
likelihood of cost growth and, consequently, to eliminating the possibility of initiating the second.  
Paradoxically, it is the dissatisfaction with cost growth that permits practices like target 
costing to work, and it is the dissatisfaction with cost growth that limits the use of strategic 
misrepresentation. Funding at a low level of probability can be revisited during the annual 
budget cycle, but in the presence of constrained resources and dissatisfaction with cost growth, 
program managers are pressured to hit those ambitious targets and minimize growth. These 
existing practices likely hold total costs lower than would be the case if the recommendations 
were adopted. Why? Those recommendations relieve the pressure to contain cost growth but 
do so in exchange for nothing other than the satisfaction of having met the estimate. Defense 
behavior has shown that two programs bursting at the budget seams is preferable to one 
program managed comfortably. 
Conclusion 
Dissatisfaction with cost growth has generated a set of recommendations designed to 
eliminate that growth. Unfortunately, adopting an inappropriate or unnecessary model may not 
be helpful; rigidity is not helpful when flexibility is needed, and foreordaining higher costs is not 
helpful. The dissatisfaction itself is helpful. 
Recall that the main concern with cost growth is that it affects the total defense program. 
Systems are delivered later or in smaller quantities than expected. Root causes of the growth 
are psychological and political biases that manifest in the behavior of programmers, program 
managers, budgeters, contractors and politicians. These biases exist for a reason, and 
accounting for them does not make them disappear. Accounting for them simply makes explicit 
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what many actors in the system know implicitly.  Failing to account for them serves to add 
pressure and incentives to the system, which may result in holding costs lower than they would 
be if the biases were accounted for.  
The underlying concern should be spending in total—not spending relative to an 
estimate. However, defense leaders and stakeholders should not be complacent about growth 
because their dissatisfaction serves a useful purpose. Rather than eliminate that dissatisfaction, 
it should be understood for the role it plays. Indeed, the present state may very well have 
evolved—not unlike Darwin’s finches—to achieve a satisfactory balance among all the forces at 
play: in this case, economic, psychological and political ones. 
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